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INTRODUCTION
Ralph Waldo Emerson once suggested that we read not for
instruction but for provocation.1 By that standard, in The Words That
Made Us, Akhil Reed Amar has written a characteristically great
book.2 This is not to deny that there is abundant instruction in its
many pages: Amar offers a synoptic and yet still nuanced description
of the great constitutional conversation that engulfed American
political life in the eighty or so years around the founding. One of the
chief values of the book, though, is that it will provoke a whole new
set of additions to the constitutional conversation that it so
ambitiously describes. The present symposium is a testament and a
preview.
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This essay was first
delivered as a talk at a symposium on Akhil Reed Amar’s The Words That Made
Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 1760–1840, held at the University of
Illinois College of Law on September 17, 2021. I am grateful to the University of
Illinois for their hospitality, and to my fellow symposiasts for the stimulating
conversation. I would also like to thank Akhil Amar, Kellen Funk, Jeremy Kessler,
Henry Monaghan, David Pozen, Caitlin Tully, and the participants in the Academic
Fellows Workshop at Columbia Law School for comments on earlier drafts of this
essay.
1. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Divinity School Address, in ESSAYS AND
LECTURES 75, 79 (Joel Porte ed., 1983); HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANATOMY OF
INFLUENCE: LITERATURE AS A WAY OF LIFE 10 (2011).
2. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE WORDS THAT MADE US:
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION, 1760–1840 (2021).
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My symposium essay will isolate and attend to one voice in the
constitutional polyphony: the judiciary. A remarkable transformation
takes place over the course of Amar’s narrative. In the beginning, the
institutional voice of the judiciary is scarcely audible. The courts’
contributions to the constitutional conversation pale in comparison to
the much more significant contributions of Presidents, cabinet
officials, members of Congress, pamphleteers, litigators, and
citizens. By the end of Amar’s story, however, the Marshall Court
has become a major voice in America’s constitutional conversation.
How did that happen? What accounts for this dramatic change in the
relative volume of the judicial voice?
The passage from judicial inaudibility to judicial preeminence
is a complex sociopolitical event that cannot be reduced to a single
cause, and that is not my intention here. But this essay will suggest
that a series of subtle, and now largely forgotten, institutional
changes that occurred in the early decades of the Supreme Court’s
existence laid the groundwork for the dramatic growth in the Court’s
importance on the constitutional scene across that same period. And
that growth, of course, has only continued: By the twenty-first
century the Supreme Court “has by a very large margin the loudest
institutional voice in constitutional debate.”3 These early institutional
choices, then, though subtle, have powerfully defined the character
of our constitutional conversation ever since.
After briefly discussing the judiciary in the colonial period, this
essay begins with two interconnected developments between the
Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution that bolstered the
idea of judicial review: The appreciation, at least among elites, of the
danger of unrestrained legislative power, and the advent of written
constitutions with special democratic authority that could serve as
sources of justiciable limits on government power. This essay then
turns to the period after the Constitution went into effect and the
federal judiciary materialized, when the early Supreme Court made a
series of critical institutional choices to define and strengthen its
voice. In particular, the Justices separated themselves from the
executive branch, they tamped down on extracurricular partisan
activities, they started to coalesce around unified “opinions of the
Court,” and they enlisted Congress to create an official reporter.
3. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 126 n.24 (2008); see Henry P. Monaghan,
Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69
DUKE L.J. 1, 21–22 (2019) (noting that after the Civil War the Supreme Court
“assume[d] an unchallengeable . . . interpretive role”).
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Blended together, these reforms enabled the Supreme Court to speak
in a powerful and distinct institutional voice. On top of these
reforms, Justice Joseph Story’s appointment to a professorship at the
fledgling Harvard Law School cemented a close connection between
the courts and the intellectual study of law that continues to this day,
further enhancing the Court’s prestige and influence.4 In all, these
institutional reforms enabled the Court to achieve the preeminence it
now enjoys in our constitutional conversation.5
I. BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
One of the first scenes described in The Words That Made Us
unfolds in a courtroom, with a lawyer arguing a case before a panel
of judges. But a reader must take care not to let the superficial
familiarity of this scene obscure the profound differences between
courts in the colonial period and today.
Before the revolution, the judiciary was a “much scorned and
insignificant appendage of crown authority.”6 Colonial judges
generally served at the pleasure of the king, lacking the tenure
protection of their British counterparts.7 And their responsibilities
ranged far beyond the now recognizable adjudicatory functions of
law declaration and dispute resolution; “[t]hey assessed taxes,
granted licenses, oversaw poor relief, supervised road repair, set
prices, upheld moral standards, and all in all monitored the localities
over which they presided.”8 No wonder, then, that colonists regarded
judges as yet more irksome avatars of central power, who needed to
be kept in check by local juries.9

4. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
5. Others, of course, have noted the gradual ascendance of the Supreme
Court’s importance in constitutional debate in the early republic. But
“[c]ommentators have largely ignored the institutional component of the Court’s
ascendance in favor of the doctrinal aspects of that development.” Craig Joyce, The
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court
Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1985) (emphasis added).
6. GORDON S. WOOD, POWER AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 126 (2021).
7. See id.; Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial
Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1976). For a survey of the early state
judiciaries, see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS
OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787 (2011).
8. WOOD, supra note 6, at 127.
9. See id.
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Thomas Hutchinson, who presides over Amar’s early
courtroom scene, exemplified the indistinct institutional identity of
the judiciary in colonial America. Hutchinson inhabited all three
“branches” of colonial government, with overlapping tenures. He
served in the General Court (the legislative assembly) and in the
Provincial Council (the upper house of the General Court).10 While
serving in the assembly, he was appointed to two judgeships, one on
the probate court and one in the Court of Common Pleas.11 Then, he
served as Lieutenant Governor and Acting Governor of
Massachusetts and accepted a post as Chief Justice of the Superior
Court while still holding his other offices.12 In short, the lines among
the branches were considerably more porous in the colonial period
than they are today, and, as a result, the voice of the judiciary did not
have the same institutional distinctness.
Amar’s account of Paxton’s Case illustrates this point well.13
When Hutchinson presided over Paxton’s Case as Chief Justice, he
was also Lieutenant Governor and a member of the elected council.14
The court’s rulings were reviewable by the Privy Council in
England, an executive body that advised the King.15 And, as a result,
the ultimate significance of Paxton’s Case for America’s
constitutional conversation was not the Superior Court’s legal
decision; rather, it was the speeches of the advocates, most notably
James Otis, Jr. arguing against writs of assistance. The only reason
we know what happened in the courtroom is that two eyewitnesses—
Hutchinson himself and a young John Adams—personally
memorialized the proceedings. Further, the court’s actual ruling was
largely an afterthought in the broader conversation: a unanimous
(and presumably oral) decision issued immediately following re10. ANDREW STEPHEN WALMSLEY, THOMAS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 25–44 (1999).

HUTCHINSON AND THE ORIGINS

11. See id.
12. See id. at 34–35; AMAR, supra note 2, at 11; GERBER, supra note 7, at
84–85.
13. Paxton’s Case involved writs of assistance, that is, writs issued by
colonial courts to local customs officers authorizing them to enter homes and other
buildings, forcibly if necessary, to search for contraband. See AMAR, supra note 2, at
8, 34, 679–80. The case presented several technical issues, but the nub of the dispute
was whether a customs officer needed some sort of individualized suspicion before
conducting a search. See id.; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)
(discussing writs of assistance); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 35–38 (1969).
14. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 14.
15. See id. at 19.
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argument of the case that John Adams did not even deign to record.16
In all, Paxton’s Case bears the hallmarks of the colonial judiciary:
indistinct institutional voice, unrecorded oral opinions, and the lack
of an official reporter. It is no wonder that the court qua court did not
speak prominently, even if a courtroom could serve as a theater for
legal and political oratory.
II. TRANSITIONING TO ARTICLE III
Following the Revolution, many Americans still regarded
judicial power warily, but that began to change over the 1780s.
“Because judges had been so much identified with the hated
magisterial power, many American Revolutionaries in 1776 sought
not to strengthen the judiciary but to weaken it.”17 One can detect this
distrust in the Articles of Confederation, which did not create a
federal judicial system of any significance, and empowered Congress
to oversee the resolution of interstate disputes through a kind of
arbitral process.18 But two intertwined developments of the 1780s
altered the attitudes of many Americans toward the judiciary before
the framing of the Constitution.
The first was a growing appreciation of the hazards of
unchecked legislative power. “By the 1780s many Americans
concluded that their popular state assemblies . . . had become the
greatest threat to minority rights and individual liberties and the
principal source of injustice in the society.”19 As a result, American
leaders increasingly looked to the judiciary as a means of restraining
popular legislatures.20 The second development was the advent of
written constitutions in the states, ratified by conventions with
special democratic credentials.21 This was a “watershed” in the
16. See id. at 20; see also Paxton’s Case, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS
OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAYS, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 57, 414 n.2
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865).
17. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 128.
18. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII.
19. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 129. Of course, not everyone shared this
diagnosis at the time. See WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 21–123 (2007).
20. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 129; see also HOLTON, supra note 19, at
186–87.
21. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776–1787, at 306–43 (1969); RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE
INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 181–283 (2015); David Singh Grewal &
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history of constitutionalism because it inaugurated “a shift from
viewing a constitution as simply a description of the fundamental
political arrangements of the society to a conception that the
constitution stood behind, or grounded and legitimated, those
arrangements—and of course constrained them.”22 Further, the
writtenness of a constitution made it more judicially tractable as a
source of limits on legislative power. As future Justice James Iredell
put it in a letter, an American-style constitution was not “a mere
imaginary thing, about which ten thousand different opinions may be
formed, but a written document to which all may have recourse, and
to which, therefore, the judges cannot willfully blind themselves.”23
A written constitution made it more possible, if not inevitable, for a
constitution to serve as a source of justiciable limits on legislative
power.24
A new attitude toward judges is evident in the Federal
Constitution, as compared to the Articles of Confederation. Most
obviously, the Constitution created a Supreme Court staffed by
judges with life tenure and salary protection.25 It empowered
Congress to create a system of inferior federal courts—which
Congress did soon after convening for the first time. The
Constitution extended the possible scope of federal jurisdiction to
“all Cases” arising under the Constitution or federal law, subject to
Jedediah Britton-Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J.
664, 677–81 (2018).
22. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 769 (1988); see also MARTIN LOUGHLIN,
AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALISM 2 (2022) (“Constitutionalism did not exist before the
idea that the basic terms of the governing relationship could be defined in a
foundational document.”). Chief Justice Marshall referred to a “written constitution”
as the “greatest improvement on political institutions” of the founding generation.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see also WOOD, supra note
21 at 259–69, 460–63. For some European forerunners to this development in
America, see LINDA COLLEY, THE GUN, THE SHIP, AND THE PEN: WARFARE,
CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 112–13 (2021).
23. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 445 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787)).
24. See id. This is not necessarily to say that the content of a constitution
was exhausted or fixed by its text for the founding generation, or that the function of
judicial review was solely to enforce a written constitution according to its terms.
See Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and Present, 39 L. & HIST.
REV. 321, 342 (2021); see also KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 77 (2011)
(describing “[d]ebates over the ontology of American constitutions”).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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congressional regulation.26 It instructed state judges to disregard state
laws in conflict with the Federal Constitution, and intimated that
federal courts would have the power of judicial review too.27
Alexander Hamilton spelled this out in Federalist No. 78, where he
confirmed that the “courts of justice” would be “bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments.”28 The crucial
theoretical move underlying that statement was made possible by the
advent of written constitutions with special democratic legitimacy.
An American legislature was no longer sovereign like a British
Parliament; rather, the will of the sovereign people was expressed in
a constitution that bound both legislatures and courts. Hence, for
Hamilton, judicial review does not “by any means suppose a
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes
that the power of the people is superior to both.”29
III. FASHIONING A JUDICIAL VOICE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
The ratification of the Federal Constitution set the federal
judiciary in motion. But it would take some time for it to assume
recognizable shape. The first step in its emergence was for Congress
to pass a law—the Judiciary Act of 1789—conjuring the lower
federal judiciary into existence and organizing the Supreme Court.30
The story of the Judiciary Act has been told well before.31 I will
focus instead on what Robert Post has called the “material substrate
of the Court’s decisionmaking practices”: the institutional choices
made largely by the Justices themselves (though often in dialogue
with the political branches) that defined the Court’s voice and
channeled that voice to the public.32 These choices were not
predetermined by Article III or the Judiciary Act. The first two
choices had to do with distinguishing the judicial voice from other
26. Id.
27. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 493.
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
29. See id. at 525.
30. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
31. See, e.g., ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 175–213 (2010); ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The TwoTiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990).
32. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice:
Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1267, 1383 (2001).
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constitutional actors; they involved suppressing certain forms of
judicial speech in order to differentiate and strengthen the residuum.
The second two changes had to do with the material reality of
conveying a distinctive, strengthened judicial voice to those other
actors and the public at large. A theme running through all of these
changes is that an institution must sometimes renounce certain
powers in order to increase its power as a whole.33 Relinquishing the
power to advise the executive branch, or to comment on partisan
issues, or to write separate opinions, then, may actually have
enhanced the power and legitimacy of the Supreme Court as an
expositor of the Constitution.34
A. Splitting from the Executive
A first important change was for the Court to cleave itself from
the Executive Branch. As I have already noted, in the colonial era,
judges were often indistinguishable from other executive
magistrates. John Adams, for instance, wrote in 1766 that the “first
grand division of constitutional powers” was legislation and
execution, and he placed the “administration of justice” in “the
executive part of the constitution.”35 And one of the more striking
features of the early Supreme Court to modern eyes is its closeness
to the Executive Branch. As Amar points out, “the positions of chief
executive and chief justice were kindred offices.”36 Early in his
presidency, Washington asked Chief Justice Jay for a formal written
opinion on what America’s position should be in a dispute between
Britain and Spain, which Jay obligingly provided.37 Washington also
sent Jay to negotiate the eponymous Jay Treaty with the British
33. See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law,
130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 64 (2016) (“[C]onstraints that reduce power when viewed in
isolation may actually serve to expand power when viewed in a broader temporal or
topical frame.”); David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV.
512, 573 (2013) (“[S]elf-binding mechanisms may . . . ultimately serve to enhance
[power] by sustaining the institution’s credibility and legitimacy.”).
34. Ironically, the survival of an independent judiciary may itself be viewed
a self-empowering and self-imposed constraint on the part of the other branches:
“[A]n independent judiciary empowers [political] actors to a greater extent than it
impedes their political agenda by enabling credible, and reciprocal, commitments.”
Levinson, supra note 33, at 66.
35. WOOD, supra note 6, at 127.
36. AMAR, supra note 2, at 470.
37. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 71–72 (1995).
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while he was Chief Justice, and Adams made Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth a special envoy to France.38 The two candidates who
finished behind Washington and Adams in the first presidential
election—Jay and Rutledge—became the first two Chief Justices.39
Jay and Rutledge also both served as state governors.40 Marshall, at
the beginning of his judicial tenure, was briefly Secretary of State
and Chief Justice at the same time.41
In this context, it makes sense that two of the most important
constitutional (and institutional) decisions made by the Justices in the
Court’s early years had the specific function of separating the
judicial department from the Executive Branch. In Hayburn’s Case,
several Justices riding circuit (sitting alongside district judges)
refused to be treated as “executive-branch bureaucrats rather than as
officials of a separate, distinct, and co-equal branch.”42 Their core
objection to the statutory scheme in question was that it invested the
Secretary of War with the power to revise a judicial judgment, which
threatened to subordinate the judicial voice to the Executive. The
next year, when President Washington, through his Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, asked the Justices for their opinion on a series of
questions arising out of European hostilities, the Justices declined,
suggesting that the President had no power to compel them to render
an advisory opinion.43 This correspondence served as a precedent that
the Court “should not—as an exercise of institutional discretion—
issue advisory opinions.”44 In both of these early episodes, the courts
refused to be mere adjutants to the executive branch. That, in turn,
would allow the Court to delineate more sharply its distinct function
of adjudicating cases and construing the law as a separate
institution.45
B. Extracurricular Partisanship
The second change was the tamping down of partisan activities
by judges. In the eighteenth century, convening a criminal court was
38. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 381.
39. See id. at 471.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 482.
42. Id. at 336.
43. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 79.
44. Id.
45. See G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815–
1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 48 & n.173 (1984).
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a public occasion, and judges would use their addresses to the grand
jury to discuss salient political issues.46 These addresses were
frequently published in newspapers.47 Early federal judges—
including Justices riding circuit—took up this custom, and, as a
result, inserted themselves into various partisan affrays.48 No one
went further in this direction than Justice Samuel Chase, who not
only stumped for Adams’ reelection while still on the bench, but
made partisan “harangues” during Sedition Act prosecutions.49 After
Jefferson’s election as President, Chase made a particularly
vituperative charge to a Baltimore grand jury, in which he inveighed
against universal suffrage.50 That last excess led to Chase’s
impeachment. Though he was acquitted, Marshall “redirected his
colleagues’ sermonizing into opinions of the Court.”51
This is not to say that the Marshall Court excused itself from
“politics,” broadly understood.52 Republican political theory
informed the Marshall Court’s approach to questions of
constitutional law.53 The constitutionality of the national bank and
Maryland’s attempt to tax it, for instance, were deeply “political”
questions.54 But the banishment of partisanship—or at least overt
partisanship in judicial utterances and opinions—gave the Supreme
Court a different kind of authority in discussing constitutional
questions.55 It allowed the courts to ground their authority in

46. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 127; see also George L. Haskins, Law
Versus Politics in the Early Years of the Marshall Court, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4
(1981).
47. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 127.
48. See id. at 127–29; see also AMAR, supra note 2, at 550.
49. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 550–51.
50. See id.
51. Id.; WOOD, supra note 23, at 438. This tradition has only strengthened.
When Justice Ginsburg commented on Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, she
earned bipartisan rebuke, and ultimately called her comments “ill advised.” See
Michael D. Shear, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Criticizing Donald
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/
us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/X3W3-SF4U].
52. See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics
Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of
Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1501–03 (2007).
53. See White, supra note 45, at 48–49.
54. Cf. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97, 257 (Harvey
C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835).
55. See White, supra note 45, at 48–49, 48 n.173.
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professionalism and legal reason.56 This move was all the more
significant in light of the well-known rise of partisanship during the
Adams and Jefferson presidencies in the political culture more
generally,57 which undercut some of Congress’s capacity to speak
authoritatively on constitutional questions.58 In that broader
environment, a court could credibly claim to bring a unique kind of
competence—or at least something different—to the constitutional
conversation.
C. Opinions of the Court
A third change, and in my view the most critical, was the
development of the practice of the “opinion[] of the Court.”59
Although Marshall is usually credited with establishing the practice,
it actually began to take hold during Chief Justice Ellsworth’s
tenure.60 Before Ellsworth, the Court often delivered its opinions
seriatim, meaning that each Justice would state his reasoning
separately.61 When Ellsworth became Chief Justice, “a clear pattern
emerged in which he would personally deliver short opinions of the
Court, infrequently supplemented by dissenting or concurring
opinions.”62 Based on Alexander Dallas’s reports, the Court delivered

56. See WOOD, supra note 23, at 453–54 (noting that, after 1800, judges
“shed their traditional broad and ill-defined political and magisterial roles” and
“increasingly saw themselves as professional jurists”).
57. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2319–22 (2006) (describing the rise of political
parties).
58. See, e.g., David E. Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and
Possibilities of Article V, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2317, 2382 (2021).
59. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 111.
60. While not strictly true, the common attribution to Marshall likely
reflects the fact that Marshall was the first to use the institution to deliver substantial
and well-crafted opinions on major constitutional questions. I, for one, could not
name off the top of my head an opinion of the Court written by Chief Justice
Ellsworth, but any 1L could probably rattle off several Marshall opinions.
61. The practice of seriatim opinions was a textual representation of another
way that the Court was far more decentralized than today. It is easy for observers of
today’s Court, ensconced in marble in the capital, to forget that riding circuit was a
vital part of a Justice’s job in the early republic. The Court’s early caseload was
light—in the first four years, it had only twelve filings. See CASTO, supra note 37, at
54–55. In those early years, “the Justices performed virtually all of their official
duties while they were serving as trial judges in the circuit courts . . . .” Id. at 55. For
more on the importance of circuit riding, see AMAR, supra note 2, at 332–34.
62. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 111.
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seriatim opinions only once when Ellsworth was in the majority.63
Ellsworth seems to have first adopted this practice from his time on
the Connecticut Superior Court in the 1780s.64 And it “became
entrenched during Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure.”65 Marshall
strengthened the practice by fostering social and professional
camaraderie among the Justices, who for many years of the Marshall
Court lived together at the same boardinghouse while in
Washington.66
The practice of the “opinion of the Court” worked differently in
Marshall’s time than in ours.67 A draft opinion was not circulated in
advance of publication for other Justices to review and formally join.
And Justices were not compelled to record their votes on whether
they concurred in the opinion, concurred in the result, or dissented.
As a result, “an ‘opinion of the Court’ [was] a highly individualized
product that certainly cannot be considered a concerted effort of a
unified court.”68 It “merely reflected one justice’s effort to advance a
formal justification for a majority decision made orally and
informally.”69
That said, a single opinion, purporting to speak for the Court as
an institution, was more publicly and politically impressive than a
hodgepodge of seriatim opinions. As James Bradley Thayer
shrewdly remarked in his biography of Marshall, the majority
opinion “seemed, all of a sudden, to give to the judicial department a
unity like that of the executive.”70 In other words, having cleaved
itself from the executive institutionally, the Supreme Court could
now speak in a unified fashion—like the executive. And its unified
63. See id.
64. See id. at 110. In 1784, Connecticut had passed a law requiring the
judges of the Supreme Court of Errors and the Superior Court “to give in writing the
reasons of their decisions upon points of law, and lodge them with their respective
clerks, with a view, as the statute expressly declares, that the cases might be fully
reported.” See Joyce, supra note 5, at 1297–98 (quoting An Act Establishing the
Wages of the Judges of the Superior Court, 3 State Rec. May Sess. 1784 at 9).
65. See CASTO, supra note 37, at 111.
66. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 547; White, supra note 45, at 5–6, 34–35;
see also ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REPUBLICS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1783–1850, at 54 (2021).
67. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously,
39 MD. L. REV. 1, 12 (1979) (noting the modern “assumption that ‘opinions of the
Court’ have a collective character, that is, that they represent the shared view, in all
points of significance, of those who join in the opinion”).
68. White, supra note 45, at 39.
69. Id.
70. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 54–55 (1901).
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voice could stand out more as partisanship increasingly fragmented
discourse in the political branches on constitutional questions.
Over the long run, it would be hard to overstate the importance
of the practice of majority opinions for giving the Court a prominent
institutional voice:
Majority opinions have played a subtle but significant role in establishing
the Supreme Court’s hegemony over the Constitution’s interpretation. A
contrary tradition of seriatim opinions would have splintered many of the
Court’s opinions into the relatively isolated and more or less different
views of the various Justices. In contrast, a single majority opinion makes
it easier for the Court to speak with a single authoritative voice.71

The development of this institutional practice played a key role in
amplifying the Supreme Court’s voice in America’s constitutional
conversation.72
D. Official Reports
A fourth and final change is the hiring of the first official
Supreme Court reporter. It is one thing to produce an opinion of the
Court; it is quite another to publish and disseminate it in an
authoritative fashion. As John Langbein has advised, “we need to
remind ourselves that the written opinion was a novelty in the later
eighteenth century.”73 In England, decisions were announced orally
(think Paxton’s Case), and then summarized and compiled by law
reporters—individuals with substantial discretion over what to

71. CASTO, supra note 37, at 111.
72. This amplification may have had the result over the long run of making
judicial forms of argumentation more important in debates about constitutional
questions. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982) (describing the “modalities” of constitutional argument);
David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 MICH. L. REV. 729, 744–
45 (2021) (noting that theorists have tended to rely on Supreme Court opinions in
identifying the modalities of constitutional argument). Constitutional law is a social
practice that may change over time. See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My
Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1919 (1994) (“Change is built into the system because
the forms of argument take their life from the general society.”). It stands to reason
that a mutable social practice will be shaped by the most important institutional
players that engage in it. The increasing prominence (and ultimate dominance) of
the Supreme Court in constitutional discourse, then, may very well have contributed
to the “professionaliz[ation]” and legalization of the modern modalities of
constitutional argument. See Pozen & Samaha, supra, at 786.
73. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 571–72 (1993).
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include in their reports.74 A number of American states had informal
reporters of this sort. Alexander Dallas became the first Supreme
Court reporter basically by happenstance, because he was preparing
reports for Pennsylvania when the Supreme Court began to sit
there.75 The early unofficial reports of the Supreme Court’s decisions
left much to be desired. They were plagued by “delay, expense,
omission and inaccuracy.”76 At one point, eight years elapsed
between the Supreme Court’s term and Dallas’s publication of the
reports. The Court’s next reporter, William Cranch (whose name
readers may recognize from citations to Marbury v. Madison), was
not much better.77
In 1804, the legislatures of Massachusetts and New York
(possibly at Chancellor Kent’s urging) for the first time designated
official reporters and arranged for them to be paid a stipend.78 By
1817, this practice finally made its way to the Supreme Court, when,
instigated by Marshall and Story, Congress created a salaried official
reporter for the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall himself
recognized the promise of official reporting for enhancing the
institutional position of the Supreme Court, writing in a letter to a
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
That the cases determined in the Supreme Court should be reported with
accuracy and promptness, is essential to correctness and uniformity of
decision in all the courts of the United States. It is also to be recollected
that from the same tribunal the public receive that exposition of the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States as applicable to the
cases of individuals which must ultimately prevail. It is obviously
important that a knowledge of this exposition be attainable by all.79

An official reporter would enable the Court to control lower courts
more effectively and disseminate its constitutional “exposition[s]” to
the people.80
74. See id. at 572, 576–77.
75. See id. at 573; Joyce, supra note 5, at 1295–96.
76. Joyce, supra note 5, at 1301, 1312. The unofficial reports were also
changed when incorporated in subsequent editions of the U.S. Reports. See Jane
Manners, Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the Marshall Court: A Rereading
of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.
1941, 1953 n.58 (2021).
77. See Joyce, supra note 5, at 1306–12.
78. See Langbein, supra note 73, at 573–74.
79. Joyce, supra note 5, at 1346–47.
80. See id. This goal was all the more important as the Court made clear
that its appellate jurisdiction covered state, as well as federal, courts. See generally
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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Henry Wheaton, an associate of Justice Story’s, was appointed
the first official reporter of the Supreme Court. After Wheaton’s
appointment, the country had “complete, meticulous and timely
reports unlike any that had gone before.”81 The quality of reports was
still somewhat uneven for a time; Wheaton’s successor, Peters, did
not share his talents.82 But the country had taken a major step in the
direction of Marshall’s vision: The Supreme Court could
communicate its constitutional vision with reasonable “accuracy and
promptness.”83 Wheaton’s very first term as reporter witnessed one
of the Marshall Court’s great constitutional decisions, Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee. Many of the other great monuments of the Marshall
Court—including McCulloch, Dartmouth College, Gibbons, and
Osborn—also appeared for the first time in Wheaton’s reports.84 In
short, “the development of a dynamic official reporter system” was
an important ingredient of “the Supreme Court’s ascendance to
power under John Marshall.”85
CONCLUSION
The judicial opinion is a complex institutional practice that
reflects and may even give rise to notions of the Supreme Court’s
function in the legal system and the nature of constitutional law. In
Robert Post’s words, “[t]he response of Justices to a changing
81. See Joyce, supra note 5, at 1388. The Reporter’s Act was actually
passed by Congress a year after Wheaton’s appointment. See id.
82. See id. at 1361.
83. See Joyce, supra note 5, at 1347.
84. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824).
85. Joyce, supra note 5, at 1293. A final development is less institutional
and more sociological, but bears mention nonetheless. In 1828, Justice Story
accepted a post as Dane Professor at Harvard Law School. AMAR, supra note 2, at
564. Story, like his friend Chancellor Kent, was thus an “artist[] who worked in
three media—the published judicial opinion, juristic writing, and legal education.”
Langbein, supra note 73, at 571. And he interconnected those media. Story’s
presence at Harvard, as well as the Commentaries he produced, not only helped to
make the study of law a substantial field of intellectual endeavor in the United
States, but he also made the Court a focal point of that study. In his own words, the
“[t]wo great sources” for his treatise were the Federalist Papers and Marshall’s
judicial opinions. AMAR, supra note 2, at 567. The Supreme Court opinion remains
to this day the backbone of legal education. These sociological connections between
the bench and the academy, like the institutional changes already described,
increased the Court’s prominence in our legal culture.
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institutional environment, or to evolving notions of law or of judicial
authority, will be mediated by their conception of the nature and
functions of Supreme Court opinions.”86 With that in mind, I have
looked to the Supreme Court’s early institutional practices to answer
the puzzle with which I began: How did the judiciary, and the
Supreme Court in particular, grow into such a prominent and
meaningful participant in America’s constitutional conversation over
the period canvassed by Amar?
The foundation for this growth was put in place between the
Revolution and the Federal Constitution, as states ratified written
constitutions with special democratic authority that could be
susceptible to judicial interpretation, and even invest judicial
interpretation with that special authority. Then, after the Federal
Constitution went into effect, the early Supreme Court Justices made
a set of critical institutional changes that both strengthened the
judicial voice and made it distinct from the other branches. The
Justices separated themselves from the President and his cabinet,
they suppressed overt partisanship, and they started to speak through
unified and elaborately reasoned “opinions of the Court” that were
disseminated in official reports. These changes remain the backbone
of the Court’s institutional identity.
Amar rightly observes that the Marshall Court “helped create
and solidify an institutionalized constitutional culture.”87 The aim of
this essay has been to give more specificity to that claim by charting
the early and now obscure institutional choices that made it possible
for the Court to vociferate as it does today.

86.
87.

See Post, supra note 32, at 1289.
See AMAR, supra note 2, at 562 (emphasis added).

